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Abstract
A cryptarithm is a mathematical puzzle where given an arithmetic
equation written with letters rather than numerals, a player must dis-
cover an assignment of numerals on letters that makes the equation hold
true. In this paper, we propose a method to construct a DFA that ac-
cepts cryptarithms that admit (unique) solutions for each base. We im-
plemented the method and constructed a DFA for bases k ≤ 7. Those
DFAs can be used as complete catalogues of cryptarithms, whose appli-
cations include enumeration of and counting the exact numbers Gk(n) of
cryptarithm instances with n digits that admit base-k solutions. More-
over, explicit formulas for G2(n) and G3(n) are given.
1 Introduction
A cryptarithm is a mathematical puzzle where a given arithmetic formula con-
sisting of letters rather than numerals, players try to find an injective substitu-
tion of numerals for letters that makes the formula hold true. Figure 1 shows a
well-known example of a cryptarithm and its solution. To solve a cryptarithm
is, in principle, not quite hard. One can find a solution (if any) by trying at most
10! assignments of numerals on letters, i.e., cryptarithms are solvable by brute
force in linear time. Nevertheless, cryptarithms have been an interesting topic of
computer science [8] and different methods for solving cryptarithms have been
proposed [1, 9] including a number of online solvers on the web (e.g., [2, 3, 11]).
In fact, although cryptarithms can be solved in linear time under the decimal
system, Eppstein [7] showed that to decide whether a given cryptarithm has a
∗This manuscript comprehends and improves our paper [10] in the proceedings of CIAA
2018.
†He is currently working in VOYAGE GROUP, Inc.
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solution under the base-k system is strongly NP-complete when k is not fixed.
His discussions involve only arithmetic formulas with just one addition, like the
one in Figure 1. Following Eppstein, this paper focuses on such formulas only.
A cryptarithm example that has a binary solution but no decimal solution is
shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 1: Example of a cryptarithm
and its solution [4]
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Figure 2: Cryptarithm solvable un-
der the binary system
Our goal is not only to provide a cryptarithm solver but to propose a method
to enumerate cryptarithms for different base systems. Towards the same goal,
Endoh et al. [6] presented a method for constructing a deterministic finite au-
tomaton (DFA) that accepts cryptarithms solvable under the base-k system for
k = 2, 3, 4. Their method constructs the goal DFA as the product of several
auxiliary DFAs corresponding to different conditions that solvable cryptarithms
must satisfy. On the other hand, our proposed method constructs the objective
DFA directly. This approach enabled us to construct the goal DFAs for k ≤ 7.
Those DFAs can be seen as complete catalogues of cryptarithms for differ-
ent bases. Once the cryptarithm DFA for base-k arithmetics is constructed,
this can be used as a cryptarithm solver using the information added to its
states that runs in linear time in the size of the input with no huge coefficient.
Moreover, different types of analyses on cryptarithms are possible with stan-
dard techniques on edge-labeled graphs. For example, one can enumerate all
the solvable cryptarithms one by one in the length-lexicographic order. It is also
possible to compute the mth solvable cryptarithm quickly without enumerating
the first m− 1 cryptarithms. Counting the number of solvable cryptarithms of
n digits is also easy. In particular, we derived explicit formulas for the number
Gk(n) of cryptarithms of n digits solvable under the base-k system for k = 2, 3
as G2(n) = 6 × 4
n−2 − 3 × 2n−2 and G3(n) = 4 × 9
n−1 − 2 × 5n−1 − 3n−1,
respectively.
2 Preliminaries
For an alphabet Σ, Σ∗ and Σ+ denote the sets of strings and non-empty strings,
respectively. For a map θ from an alphabet Σ to another ∆, its homomorphic
extension from Σ∗ to ∆∗ is denoted by θˆ. For a string or a tuple of strings w
over ∆, Σ↾w denotes the subset of Σ consisting of letters occurring in w. An
extension of a function f : A → B is a function g : A′ → B′ such that A ⊆ A′
and g(x) = f(x) for all x ∈ A. The cardinality of a set A is denoted by |A|.
The length of a string w is also denoted by |w|. We let Nk denote the alphabet
of numerals 0, . . . , k − 1.
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2.1 Cryptarithms
A cryptarithm is a triple ~w = 〈w1, w2, w3〉 of non-empty strings over an al-
phabet Σ. Each wi is called the i
th term. The size of ~w is defined to be
max{|w1|, |w2|, |w3|}. Any injection from Σ↾~w to Nk is called a base-k as-
signment for ~w. Moreover it is a base-k solution if it makes the equation
θˆ(w1) + θˆ(w2) = θˆ(w3) true when interpreting strings over Nk as numerals
in the base-k system: that is, for wi = wi,|wi| . . . wi,1 with wi,j ∈ Σ, it holds∑|w1|
j=1 θ(w1,j)k
j−1 +
∑|w2|
j=1 θ(w2,j)k
j−1 =
∑|w3|
j=1 θ(w3,j)k
j−1 and θ(wi,|wi|) 6= 0
for each i = 1, 2, 3. A cryptarithm that admits a solution is said to be base-k
solvable.
Following Endoh et al. [6], in order for DFAs to treat cryptarithms, we
convert cryptarithms into single strings over Σ ∪ {$} with $ /∈ Σ by
ψ(〈w1, w2, w3〉) = w1,1w2,1w3,1 w1,2w2,2w3,2 . . . w1,nw2,nw3,n $$$
where wi = wi,|wi| . . . wi,1, n = max{|w1|, |w2|, |w3|}, and wi,j = $ for |wi| <
j ≤ n. Such a string ψ(~w) is called a cryptarithm sequence.
Example 1. Let ~w = 〈send, more, money〉. This admits a unique base-10 so-
lution θ = {d 7→ 7, e 7→ 5, y 7→ 2, n 7→ 6, r 7→ 8, o 7→ 0, s 7→ 9, m 7→ 1}. The
sequential form of ~w is ψ(~w) = deynre eonsmo $$m $$$.1
We say that two instances ~w and ~v are equivalent if there is a bijection γ
from Σ↾~w to Σ↾~v such that γˆ(~w) = ~v. In such a case, an injection θ : Σ↾~v → Nk
is a base-k solution for ~v if and only if so is θ ◦ γ for ~w. Fixing the alphabet to
be Σk = {a1, . . . , ak}, we define the canonical form among equivalent instances.
A base-k cryptarithm ~w ∈ (Σ∗k)
3 is said to be canonical if
• wherever ai+1 occurs in the sequential form ψ(~w) of ~w, it is after the first
occurrence of ai for any i ≥ 1.
Identifying a cryptarithm and its sequential form, we adapt terminology on
cryptarithms for cryptarithm sequences as well. For example, the sequen-
tial form of a canonical cryptarithm is also called canonical. A solution of a
cryptarithm instance is also said to be a solution of its sequential form.
For the ease of presentation, we use Latin letters a, b, c, . . . instead of a1, a2, a3, . . .
when k is relatively small: k ≤ 26.
Example 2. The cryptarithm ~w = 〈send, more, money〉 in Example 1 is not
canonical. Its canonical form is ~v = 〈gbda, hfeb, hfdbc〉, whose sequential form
is ψ(~v) = abc debbfd ghf$$h $$$.
3 Cryptarithm DFAs
3.1 Naive Cryptarithm DFA
We will define a DFA Mk that accepts all and only canonical cryptarithms that
admit solutions. Our DFA is slightly different from the standard ones. First,
each edge is labeled by a trigram so that letters belonging to the same place
1For readability a small space is inserted in every three letters.
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will be read at once. Second, it has two distinguishable accepting states f1
and f2 where cryptarithm sequences with unique and multiple solutions shall
be accepted at f1 and at f2, respectively. Accordingly, our DFA is a sextuple
Mk = 〈Q,Σk, δ, q0, f1, f2〉 where Qk is the state set, δ : Q× (Σk ∪ {$})
3 ⇀ Q is
the transition partial function, and f1 and f2 are accepting states, which define
two languages
Lk,uniq = {w ∈ (Σk ∪ {$})
+ | δˆ(q0, w) = f1 }
= {ψ(~w) ∈ (Σk ∪ {$})
+ | ~w admits exactly one solution } , (1)
Lk,multi = {w ∈ (Σk ∪ {$})
+ | δˆ(q0, w) = f2 }
= {ψ(~w) ∈ (Σk ∪ {$})
+ | ~w admits at least two solutions } , (2)
where δˆ is the usual extension of δ for domain ((Σk∪{$})
3)∗. We call a string w ∈
((Σk∪{$})
3)∗ valid if it is a prefix of some canonical cryptarithm sequence with
at least one solution. We say that an assignment θ : Σk↾w → Nk is consistent
with w if there is an extension of θ which is a solution of a cryptarithm sequence
of which w is a prefix. When Σk↾w = Σk−1, each consistent assignment on Σk−1
has just one trivial proper extension injection with domain Σk. Therefore, we
“promote” consistent assignments on Σk−1 to their extensions on Σk. We let
Θ(w) denote the set of consistent assignments, possibly with promotion:
Θ(w) =
{
{ θ : Σk → Nk | θ is consistent with w } if Σk↾w = Σk−1,
{ θ : Σk↾w → Nk | θ is consistent with w } otherwise.
For a valid sequence w, one can characterize succeeding sequences v that will
make wv a solvable canonical cryptarithm sequence with Θ(w) and other pa-
rameters. The parameters the DFA Mk maintains in its states have the form
〈d1, d2, ℓ, P 〉, which we will call a configuration. Every state except accepting
ones has a unique configuration. Among those parameters, d1, d2 ∈ {0, 1} are
used to ensure that a sequence may be extended to a cryptarithm sequence
and ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k} is used to ensure that a sequence may be extended to a
canonical one. The last parameter P is a non-empty set that remembers pos-
sible assignments on letters together with auxiliary information. Suppose that
the configuration of the state q reached from q0 by reading a valid sequence
w in Mk is 〈d1, d2, ℓ, P 〉 and let w = w
′x1x2x3 with x1, x2, x3 ∈ Σk ∪ {$} and
ψ−1(w) = 〈w1, w2, w3〉. Then,
• di = 1 if xi = $ and di = 0 otherwise for i = 1, 2,
• ℓ = min{k, |Σ↾w|+ 1},
• P consists of [θ, c, b1, b2] ∈ Θ(w)× {0, 1}
3 where
– θ ∈ Θ(w),
– θˆ(w1) + θˆ(w2) = θˆ(w3) + ck
|w3|,
– bi = 0 if xi 6= $ and θ(xi) = 0, and bi = 1 otherwise, for i = 1, 2.
One can see P as a function from Θ(w) to {0, 1}3. For [θ, c, b1, b2] ∈ P , when
c = 1, we have a carry under the assignment θ. When bi = 0, the i
th term must
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be extended to have a more significant digit since the current most significant
digit is 0 under θ.
Now let us define Mk = 〈Q,Σk, δ, q0, f1, f2〉 so that Mk satisfies the above.
We identify a state and its configuration, since no distinct states have the same
configuration: in case two states happen to have the same configuration, they
must be merged. The initial state is the configuration 〈0, 0, 1, {[∅, 0, 0, 0]}〉,
where ∅ is the empty assignment.
The transition function δ is defined as follows. For x1, x2, x3 ∈ Σk ∪ {$}, let
us write 〈d1, d2, ℓ, P 〉
x1x2x3====⇒ 〈d′1, d
′
2, ℓ
′, P ′〉 if
• x3 = $ implies x1 = x2 = $,
• di = 1 implies xi = $ for i = 1, 2,
• d′i = 1 if xi = $, and d
′
i = 0 otherwise, for i = 1, 2,
• x1 ∈ Σℓ ∪ {$}, x2 ∈ Σℓ1 ∪ {$}, x3 ∈ Σℓ2 ∪ {$}, where ℓ1 = ℓ if x1 ∈ Σℓ
and ℓ1 = min{k, ℓ+ 1} otherwise, and ℓ2 is defined from ℓ1 and x2 in the
same manner,
• ℓ′ is defined from ℓ2 and x3 in the same manner,
• P ′ = { p′ | p
x1x2x3−−−−→ p′ for some p ∈ P } is not empty,
where we write [θ, c, b1, b2]
x1x2x3−−−−→ [θ′, c′, b′1, b
′
2] if
• bi = 0 implies xi 6= $ for i = 1, 2,
• θ′ : Σ′ → Nk is an extension of θ where Σ
′ = Σk if ℓ
′ = k, and Σ′ = Σℓ′−1
otherwise,
• c+ θ˜′(x1) + θ˜
′(x2) = c
′k + θ˜′(x3) where θ˜
′ extends θ′ by θ˜′($) = 0,
• b′i = 0 if xi 6= $ and θ
′(xi) = 0, and b
′
i = 1 otherwise, for i = 1, 2.
If x1x2x3 6= $$$, then we define δ(q, x1x2x3) = q
′ for q
x1x2x3====⇒ q′. When
x1x2x3 = $$$, this means the end of the input sequence, if it is a cryptarithm
sequence. For q′ = 〈d′1, d
′
2, ℓ
′, P ′〉 with q
$$$
==⇒ q′, we define δ(q, $$$) = f1 if
|P ′| = 1, and δ(q, $$$) = f2 if |P
′| ≥ 2.
The state set Q is defined to consist of the states reachable from the initial
state according to δ.
Example 3. Let k = 3. Suppose that a state q in M3 has a configuration
〈d1, d2, ℓ, P 〉 = 〈0, 0, 2, P 〉 with
P = { [{a 7→ 0}, c, b1, b2] } = { [{a 7→ 0}, 0, 0, 0] } .
In fact, this state is reached by reading aaa from the initial state, where we did
not yet find $ (so d1 = d2 = 0), the second letter b may appear in the nearest
future (so ℓ = 2), and the only consistent assignment θ maps a to 0 (otherwise
θ(a) + θ(a) 6= θ(a)), under which we have no carry (c = 0), but each term must
not finish (b1 = b2 = 0). Therefore, this state q has no outgoing transition edge
labeled with a trigram including $. When reading aaa again from this state,
the situation does not change. So we have δ(q, aaa) = q. If we read abb, where
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b is a new letter, we reach a new state q′. Although the last letter c in Σ3 has
not appeared yet, it is ready to come. The domain of the assignments in the
configuration of q′ is now Σ3. We have two consistent assignments extending
the one {a 7→ 0} in q. One maps b to 1 and the other maps b to 2. In both
cases, we have no carry and the second term may finish. Thus, the configuration
of q′ is 〈0, 0, 3, P ′〉 with
P ′ = { [{a 7→ 0, b 7→ 1, c 7→ 2}, 0, 0, 1], [{a 7→ 0, b 7→ 2, c 7→ 1}, 0, 0, 1] } .
On the other hand, it is not hard to see that there is no p′′ such that [{a 7→
0}, 0, 0, 0]
abc
−−→ p′′. Hence q has no edge labeled with abc. In this way, we decide
whether a state has an outgoing edge labeled with a trigram over Σk ∪ {$} and
the configuration of the reached state.
We have now established Equations (1) and (2). An assignment θ is a so-
lution of a cryptarithm sequence w$$$ if and only if [θ, 0, 1, 1] ∈ P of the
configuration 〈d1, d2, ℓ, P 〉 of the state δ(q0, w). In other words, one can regard
our DFA as a Mealy machine that outputs solutions when reading $$$.
We remark that the constructed DFA is minimum as a Mealy machine but
is not necessarily minimum if we ignore output solutions. For example, let
us consider the states reached by abc$ab and abc$ba from the initial state
in M3. They have different configurations 〈1, 0, 3, P1〉 and 〈1, 0, 3, P2〉 where
Pi = { [{a 7→ i, b 7→ (3 − i), c 7→ 0}, 0, 1, 1] } for i = 1, 2. Those states are
not merged but the strings that will lead us to the accepting state f1 from
those states coincide; namely, they have the form $x1x1 . . .$xnxn$$$ where
xi ∈ {a, b, c} for i < n, xn ∈ {a, b} and n ≥ 0.
The number of states of Mk is bounded by the number of possible config-
urations. A trivial and loose upper bound on it is 2O(k!). If one is interested
only in cryptarithms with a unique solution, one can remove the state f2. If
uniqueness of a solution does not matter, two accepting states f1 and f2 can be
merged.
Figure 3 shows the finally obtained automaton for k = 2. This automaton
M2 misses the accepting state f2, because no cryptarithm has two distinct binary
solutions.
3.2 Compressed Cryptarithm DFA
By observing Fig. 3, one may realize that the DFA has isomorphic substructures.
Namely, the sub-automaton M22 whose initial state is set to be 2 is isomorphic
to M152 with initial state 15 by swapping a and b on the edge labels. There
exist just two binary assignments, {a 7→ 0, b 7→ 1} and {a 7→ 1, b 7→ 0}. The
first trigram of any cryptarithm sequence uniquely determines one of the two
as a consistent assignment. The former assignment corresponds to M22 and the
latter to M152 . We say that two configurations 〈d1, d2, ℓ, P 〉 and 〈d
′
1, d
′
2, ℓ
′, P ′〉
are permutative variants if d1 = d
′
1, d2 = d
′
2, ℓ = ℓ
′, and there is a bijection π
on Σm with m = k if ℓ = k and m = ℓ− 1 otherwise such that
P ′ = π(P ) = { [θ ◦ π, c, b1, b2] | [θ, c, b1, b2] ∈ P } .
Clearly if the configurations of two states are permutative variants, the subau-
tomata consisting of reachable states from those states are isomorphic under the
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Figure 3: DFAM2 that accepts binary solvable canonical cryptarithm sequences.
The initial state is q0 = 1 and the accepting state is f1 = 28. The other accepting
state f2 is missing in M2.
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Figure 4: DFA with permutation edges for binary solvable canonical cryptarithm
sequences, where black trigram labels are with the identity permutation ι and
red boxed trigram labels are with {a 7→ b, b 7→ a}.
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permutation. This allows us to reduce the size of the automaton by merging
those states. In our new DFA M˜k, each transition edge has two labels: one
is a trigram as before and the other is a permutation on Σk. After passing a
transition edge labeled with a permutation π, we will follow transition edges by
replacing each letter in accordance with π. Figure 4 shows M˜2.
We formally define this new kind of DFAs with edges labeled with a let-
ter and a permutation. A DFA with permutation edges is a sextuple M =
〈Q,Σ, δ, γ, q0, F 〉, where δ and γ are partial functions Q×Σ ⇀ Q and Q×Σ⇀
ΠΣ, respectively, where ΠΣ is the set of all permutations over Σ, such that the
domains of δ and γ coincide. For x ∈ Σ, w ∈ Σ∗ and q ∈ Q, define δˆ : Q×Σ∗ ⇀ Q
and γˆ : Q× Σ∗ ⇀ ΠΣ by
δˆ(q, ε) = q,
γˆ(q, ε) = ι,
δˆ(q, wx) = δ(δˆ(q, w), γˆ(q, w)(x)),
γˆ(q, wx) = γ(δˆ(q, w), γˆ(q, w)(x)) ◦ γˆ(q, w),
where ι is the identity. The strings that the automaton M accepts are those
w ∈ Σ∗ such that δˆ(q0, w) ∈ F . Mealy machines with permutation edges can
also be defined, where outputs may depend on the current state, permutation
and next input letter.
We modifyMk to M˜k by merging states that are permutative variants into a
representative and adding appropriate permutation labels to edges. We choose
as representative the state that is lexicographically earliest among permutative
variants with respect to their representations in the implementation. In our
cryptarithm DFAs with permutation edges, permutation labels are defined on
letters in Σk and homomorphically extended to trigrams on Σk∪{$}, where $ is
always mapped to $ itself. Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo code for constructing
M˜k. An assignment θ ◦ γˆ(q0, w) is a solution of a cryptarithm sequence w$$$ if
and only if [θ, 0, 1, 1] ∈ P for the configuration 〈d1, d2, ℓ, P 〉 of the state δˆ(q0, w).
3.3 Comparison of Naive and Compressed Cryptarithm
DFAs
Table 1 compares the numbers of states and edges ofMk and M˜k. We succeeded
in calculating the automata for k ≤ 7 but gave up for k ≥ 8 due to the long
time calculation and big memory consumption. For the purpose of reference, we
also show the number of states of min(Mk), the minimized version of Mk. Note
that minimization loses the information of possible solutions for cryptarithm
sequences and therefore min(Mk) cannot be used as a solver. Our compression
technique achieves a more compact representation than the classical state mini-
mization technique for solvable cryptarithm sequences, while keeping the solver
function. Table 2 compares the time and space used to construct Mk and M˜k.
Our implementation was compiled with Go 1.10 on Ubuntu 14.04 LTS with
CPU Xeon E5-2609 2.4GHz and 256 GB memory. To construct M˜k requires
much shorter time and smaller memory than Mk for all k.
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Algorithm 1 Constructing M˜k
1: let q0 := 〈0, 0, 1, {[∅, 0, 0, 0]}〉 and Q := {q0, f1, f2};
2: push q0 to the stack;
3: while the stack is not empty do
4: pop the top element q from the stack;
5: for each trigram u on Σk ∪ {$} do
6: if there is a configuration q′ such that q
u
=⇒ q′ then
7: if u = $$$ then
8: if q′ = 〈d1, d2, ℓ, P 〉 with |P | = 1 then
9: add an edge from q to f1 with label 〈u, ι〉;
10: else
11: add an edge from q to f2 with label 〈u, ι〉;
12: end if
13: else
14: let π ∈ ΠΣk be such that π(q
′) = q′′ is the canonical form of q′;
15: if q′′ /∈ Q then
16: add q′′ to Q and push q′′ to the stack;
17: end if
18: add an edge from q to q′′ with label 〈u, π〉;
19: end if
20: end if
21: end for
22: end while
23: return 〈Q,Σk, δ, γ, q0, f1, f2〉;
Table 1: Numbers of states and edges of cryptarithm automata
Base k 2 3 4 5 6 7
Mk 28 110 859 10267 370719 30909627
States M˜k 15 27 163 1061 17805 472518
min(Mk) 27 93 607 6589 248192 –
Mk 112 1032 17662 350019 23508141 3017993409
Edges M˜k 58 233 3860 40042 1214972 48635469
min(Mk) 111 985 16602 330297 22673144 –
Table 2: Used computational resources for constructing cryptarithm automata
Base k 2 3 4 5 6 7
Time Mk < 0.01 < 0.01 0.03 0.59 35 87min.
(sec.) M˜k < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 0.15 4.0 149 sec.
Space Mk < 2 < 2 4.6 20 1.0GB 91GB
(MB) M˜k < 2 < 2 3.1 6.6 80MB 3.1GB
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Table 3: Numbers of states of M˜k,s
k\s 2 3 4 5 6
7 19 271 4098 57356 390370
8 23 302 5623 133385 2180416
9 20 313 6688 220255 6279611
10 19 320 7507 328959 13920691
Table 4: Construction times of M˜k,s (sec.)
k\s 2 3 4 5 6
7 < 0.01 0.01 0.6 10 90 sec.
8 < 0.01 0.03 1.4 34 11 min.
9 < 0.01 0.04 3.0 107 52 min.
10 < 0.01 0.07 6.1 307 210 min.
3.4 Cryptarithms with Limited Number of Letters
As we have observed in the previous subsection, we were unable to compute
Mk and M˜k for k ≥ 8. On the other hand, there are many interesting decimal
cryptarithms in the real world that do not involve all the ten numerals. It is still
interesting to construct a DFA M˜k,s that accepts all and only base-k solvable
cryptarithm sequences over Σs for s ≤ k. This can be achieved by a slight
modification on Algorithm 1, where we refrain from making transition edges
whose label includes forbidden letters not in Σs. In addition, when s = k−1, we
need to give up “promotion” of an assignment with domain Σk−1 to its extension
with domain Σk. This results actually in a simpler construction algorithm.
Tables 3 and 4 show the numbers of states and the computation times of the
construction of M˜k,s for 7 ≤ k ≤ 10 and 2 ≤ s ≤ 6.
4 Analysis of Cryptarithms
Cryptarithm automata Mk, M˜k and M˜k,s can be used as cryptarithm puzzle
solvers as we have described in the previous section. Moreover, they can be used
as complete catalogues of solvable cryptarithms. For example, one can count
the number of base-k solvable cryptarithms of size n and one can enumerate the
base-k solvable cryptarithm sequences by the length-lexicographic order.
4.1 Counting Solvable Cryptarithms
The number Fk(n) of base-k uniquely solvable cryptarithms of size n is the
number of the paths of length n+1 from the initial states to the accepting state
f1 in M˜k. The number Gk(n) of (not necessarily uniquely) solvable cryptarithms
is obtained by adding the number of paths to the accepting state f2 to this
number. Those numbers can be calculated by the standard technique using the
adjacency matrix Ak of the automaton in O(m
3
k logn) time, where mk is the
number of states of the automaton (i.e., mk is the number of rows (columns) of
Ak). Table 5 summarizes the numbers of uniquely and not necessarily uniquely
solvable cryptarithms for n ≤ 8. Note that there are no difficulties to compute
Fn(k) and Gn(k) for bigger n. Although we have computed M˜7, we were unable
to calculate F7(n) and G7(n) even for small numbers n by multiplying the
adjacency matrices due to the size of the matrices. Moreover, for k = 2, 3,
we obtain Fk(n) and Gk(n) as explicit formulas of n using Mathematica
TM as
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follows.
F2(n) = G2(n) = 6× 4
n−2 − 3× 2n−2
F3(n) = 4× 9
n−1 − 4× 5n−1 − 3n−1
G3(n) = 4× 9
n−1 − 2× 5n−1 − 3n−1
Unfortunately, MathematicaTM returned no answers for bigger k ≥ 4 within 3
days on our environment.
Table 5: The numbers Fk(n) and Gk(n) of uniquely and not necessarily uniquely
solvable cryptarithms, respectively. Among those, numbers shown with bold
figures were not known in [5].
Fk(n):
k\n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 0 3 18 84 360 1488 6048 24384
3 1 19 233 2443 23825 223939 2063993 18821563
4 1 46 1200 24094 431424 7326008 121032266 1970599868
5 0 42 3190 125940 3866438 106663574 2797440502 71604333066
6 0 10 3470 336367 18978996 847469530 33983003374 1292957034805
Gk(n):
k\n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 0 3 18 84 360 1488 6048 24384
3 1 23 265 2639 24913 229703 2093785 18973439
4 2 69 1463 26716 456639 7561377 123194460 1990281467
5 2 115 4622 148483 4184478 110899540 2852251360 72299094358
6 2 123 8650 498307 22931188 933488391 35745728867 1327783229135
4.2 Enumerating and Indexing Cryptarithms
By depth-first search on a cryptarithm automaton, one can enumerate all the
base-k (uniquely) solvable cryptarithm sequences by length-lexicographic order.
Moreover, from an index number i, one can efficiently give the ith (uniquely)
solvable cryptarithm sequence. This can be computed in O(m3kn logn) time,
where n is the length of the ith cryptarithm, using powers of the adjacency
matrix Ak. Conversely, from a solvable cryptarithm of length n, the indexing
number of it can be computed in O(m3kn logn) time as well. As examples, the
first 30 ternary solvable cryptarithm sequences are given below.
aab$$$, aaabbc$$$, aab$$b$$$, aab$aa$$$, aab$ba$$$,
aab$bb$$$, aaba$a$$$, aabaab$$$, aabb$a$$$, aabb$b$$$,
aba$aa$$$, aba$cc$$$, abaaac$$$, abacca$$$, abbb$b$$$,
abbbbc$$$, abbc$c$$$, abbccb$$$, abc$$a$$$, abc$$b$$$,
abc$ab$$$, abc$ba$$$, abca$b$$$, abcb$a$$$, aaaaaabbc$$$,
aaaabbb$b$$$, aaaabbbbc$$$, aaaabbc$c$$$, aaaabbccb$$$, aaabab$bb$$$
5 Conclusions and Discussions
This paper proposed an algorithm to construct a DFA that accepts solvable
cryptarithms under the base-k numeral system. Our construction method in-
12
volves a technique to reduce the number of states more significantly than the
classical minimization of DFAs by enriching transition edge labels. We im-
plemented the algorithm and constructed cryptarithm DFAs for 2 ≤ k ≤ 7.
Moreover, by limiting the number of letters used in cryptarithms to s ≤ k, we
managed to construct DFAs for even bigger bases. Using those automata, we
demonstrated that the numbers of base-k solvable cryptarithms of n digits are
computable for 2 ≤ k ≤ 6.
Our compression technique is based on the symmetry among assignments.
Another type of symmetry is found between the first and second summand
terms. It is future work to take advantage of this type of symmetry to reduce
the size of cryptarithm DFAs. We are also interested in applying our DFAs for
generating alphametics, which are cryptarithms with meaningful words.
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